Following these criticisms, three positive arguments in favor of the deontic conception are sketched. Motivation in Philosophy of Action. According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, The dissertation is structured in three parts.
The context is quite different from what Zeno asserts in a. Piso 5 Pison onis, m. Gombrich, E. I, his scant inclusion in the cycle would have been only a small tribute to the original patron of the artistic project. Ambiguity, logical impossibility, irrelevance, and inappropriateness are keywords to the theory, which is deeply connected to the contemporary social milieu and what every culture considers as normal. Caelianus 11 a, um : de Caelius translate.
The second concerns the death of desire principle, i. The first part examines the main conceptions of desire in light of these desiderata. I argue that the classical pictures of desire do not adequately meet our desiderata. In the second part, I defend this conception with the help of three arguments. In the last part, I develop the deontic view to draw a cartography of the various types of desire. Some desires are correct, while others are inappropriate. Two study cases are examined: caprice and the impermissibility of desire aggregation.
Intuitively, hopes, wishes, or urges are types of desire.
In conclusion, I show the relevance of the deontic view for several debates in philosophy of mind and ethics. The paper presents a positive argument for a version of metaphysically light ethical non-naturalism from the nature of mental states such as desires. It uses as its premise the time-honoured, and recently rediscovered, doctrine of the guise of the good, whereby it is essential to desire that the object of desire be conceived as good or as normatively favoured under some description. The argument is that if the guise of the good is a correct theory of desire, then a certain First I define ethical non-naturalism and the guise of the good, providing also an initial defence of the latter.
Then I briefly survey some historical precedents and proceed to the argument. For each major meta-ethical view I consider I offer reasons why combining them with the guise of the good leads to consequences that are or should be unwelcome by the guise of the good. At the end of this elimination process a form of relatively metaphysically light non-naturalism will emerge as the view that best fits with the guise of the good. Moral Nonnaturalism in Meta-Ethics. This paper presents an account of the nature of desire, informed by psychology and neuroscience, which entails that hunger is not a desire.
One reason to draw this distinction is that experiments on incentive learning show What do human beings desire? Desire is diverse, multi-layered, often contradictory, directed to the most various goals: from the satisfaction of the simplest, biologically-related needs, such as hunger, thirst, or sexuality, to elaborate forms of desire for self-realization, social recognition or religious experience. But what is the ultimate goal of desire? Is there such a goal?
The book examines desire as a phenomenon in the intersection area of anthropological and psychological philosophy. It deals with the anthropological principle, indicated in Plato It critically reconsiders this principle by taking into account current phenomenology, empirical psychology and neuroscience. We argue that desire is an attitude that relates a person not to one proposition but rather to two, the first of which we call the object of the desire and the second of which we call the condition of the desire.
This view of desire is initially motivated by puzzles about conditional desires. It is not at all obvious how best to draw the distinction between conditional and unconditional desires. In this paper we examine extant attempts to analyse conditional From the failures of those attempts, we draw a moral that leads us to the correct account of conditional desires. We then extend the account of conditional desires to an account of all desires.
We attempt to explain the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desire in light of our account of desire. Finally, we extend the account of desire to related phenomena, such as conditional promises, intentions, and commands. Conditional Assertion in Philosophy of Language. Intrinsic Value in Value Theory, Miscellaneous. Logic of Conditionals in Philosophy of Language. This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it.
Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean theory.
The essay addresses the classic In each case a Humean account explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act. In his first reading of Husserlian phenomenology, Levinas offered a very interesting criticism of the very notion of intuition, understood as an impossible pretension to grasp in its supposed immediacy the self-giving of the Origin. In his mature work, the role of the Husserlian intuition is played by desire: but the latter is conceived in its strong irreducibility to nostalgia.
Human desire is always desire of the same for the other. This paper tries to understand the delayed temporalityof desire as Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind. Pleasure and Desire in Philosophy of Mind. In this paper, I want to show that this is a missed opportunity, certainly for Brentano scholars but also for contemporary philosophy of mind. Brentano: Consciousness in 19th Century Philosophy. The Will in Philosophy of Action.
Theories of Emotion, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires.
I argue that Moreover, it is quite difficult to articulate general principles of rationality for desires, and even according to the most plausible of these possible principles, desires about fiction are not irrational. Rational Requirements in Epistemology. Theories of Imagination in Philosophy of Mind. In its strongest form, this Reward Event Theory RET claims that all positive motivation, primary and learned, is functionally dependent on these reward events. Some of the empirical evidence is reviewed which either supports or challenges RET. The paper examines the implications of RET for the concepts of 'motivation', 'desire' and 'reward' or 'pleasure'.
It is argued 1 that a 'causal base' as opposed to a functional' concept of motivation has theoretical advantages; 2 that a causal distinction between the focus' and the 'anchor' of desire suggests an ineliminable 'opacity' of desire; and 3 that some affective concept, such as 'pleasure', should play a key role in psychological explanation, distinct from that of motivational or cognitive concepts. A concept of 'reward' or 'pleasure' as intrinsically positive affect is defended, and contrasted with the more 'operational' definitions of 'reward' in some of the hypotheses of Roy Wise. Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind.
Philosophy of Cognitive Science. I argue, contrary to wide-spread opinion, that belief-desire psychology is likely to reduce smoothly to neuroscientific theory. I therefore reject P. Churchland's eliminativism and Fodor's nonreductive materialism. The case for this claim consists in an example reduction of the desire construct to a suitable construct in neuroscience.
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A brief account of the standard view of intertheoretic reduction is provided at the outset. An analysis of the desire construct in belief-desire psychology is then undertaken. Armed with these tools, the paper moves This examination provides the basis for a theory of the neurophysiology of desire.
A neurophysiological state is isolated and claimed to be type-identical to the state of desiring. To desire is to be in a particular state of mind. It is a state of mind familiar to everyone who has ever wanted to drink water or desired to know what has happened to an old friend, but its familiarity does not make it easy to give a theory of desire.
Controversy immediately breaks out when asking whether wanting water and desiring knowledge are, at bottom, the same state of mind as others that seem somewhat similar: wishing never to It is argued here that all desires are prohibited by nisk? Two objections are considered: 1 desire is a necessary condition of action, and 2 the Indian tradition as a whole accepts desire as a necessary condition of action. A distinction is drawn here between a goal and a desire, and it is argued that goals. Asian Philosophy. Classical Chinese Philosophy in Asian Philosophy.
It is misleading to say that shu concerns the nature of desire in the ordinary sense, for it has more to do with the manner of satisfaction than Buddhist Ethics in Normative Ethics.
Chinese Philosophy: Ethics in Asian Philosophy. Traditional "informed desire" tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth. An extrinsic desire is defined as a desire for something, not for its own sake, but for its supposed propensity to secure something else that one desires.
I begin by defining desire as a propositional attitude with a desirability characterization. The roles of desire and intention in practical reasoning are distinguished. I show that extrinsic desire does not have its own motivational role. I also show that extrinsic desire is Finally, I argue that an account of extrinsic motivation in terms of intention is preferable to an account in terms of extrinsic desire.
Because of the fundamental differences between extrinsic desire and intrinsic desire, it is more advantageous to distinguish between them as different kinds of mental states: intention and desire. This paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that 'desiderative coherence' is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons.
For example, on Michael Smith's neo-rationalist view, you have 'normative reason' to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to do, whether you want For these reasons to be non-agent-relative, coherence would have to be grounded in rationality, but I argue that it is not. I analyze, and reject, various strategies for establishing a coherence-rationality connection, considering in detail a purported analogy between desires and a priori beliefs, with particular attention to the case of mathematics.
Moral Coherentism in Meta-Ethics. Moral Rationalism in Meta-Ethics. Moral Rationality in Meta-Ethics. Plato in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy. Psychoanalysis and Consciousness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Psychoanalysis, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Sigmund Freud in 19th Century Philosophy. Socrates in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy. History of Western Philosophy, Misc. Moral Emotion, Misc in Normative Ethics. She looks like a bloody clown!
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