Cambridge, MA ; id. Hume on Justice. Hume, Identity, and Aesthetic Universality. Politisches Handeln nach Arendt und Kant. Such ruminations may seem superfluous to those who view democracy as a formal system of governance. In: Norton ed. Its Origins and Originality. See also Assmann: Societies see note 9 , esp.
A look at essays published in English also suggests a preponderance of Kant; the ration, however, is far less striking: to for the period between and , and to since The ratio for books published in English in the same period is 63 on Hume and on Kant. In: Stanley Hoffmann ed. Chicago , pp. Princeton , pp. Shklars politische Philosophie.
Judith Shklars negative Anthropologie des Liberalismus. Der Liberalismus der Furcht. Berlin The healthy zest and opposition arising from the conflict and interchange of ideas, tastes, and personality in a free society is a much more fruitful source of new and significant experiences than the peace of dull, dead uniformity. Instead, I am particularly interested in what happens when we call into question the distinction between morality, often associated with re- strictive if not repressive regimes of bourgeois or petty bourgeois morality, on the one hand, and the allegedly more respectable and dignified realm of ethics, on the other.
What I encourage is therefore not an analysis of abstract ethical ideals but an exploration of the entanglement of, and the shady areas between, on the one hand, manners and civility, and on the other, sociability and the political. Marsden eds. New York , pp. Caspary: Dewey on Democracy. Ithaca Such arguments were especially popular in the early Federal Republic.
No- tably politicians and intellectuals that had a keen sense for the fragility of democracy would em- phasize how central questions of form, aesthetics, and style were for the search for democracy in the shadow of violence, see: Theodor Heuss: Um Deutschlands Zukunft In: Eberhard Pikart ed.
Aufzeichnungen — In: Martin Vogt ed. In: Rechtsprobleme in Staat und Kirche. Mannheim , pp. This is known as normative reasoning. Another attempts to de- scribe the morals, ethics and evaluative procedures that individuals and occasion- ally communities in fact adhere to, putting aside the question of whether those values are worth having. This line of reasoning is descriptive rather than norma- tive.
Although this distinction between normative and descriptive ways of reason- ing appears to be self-evident, the boundaries are often blurred. Close to three centuries of reflections on not just the inevitability, but the necessity of sub- jective viewpoints and vantage points for any form of historical knowledge sug- gests that this is impossible. To study the entanglement of democracy and intimacy in postwar Germany from the vantage point of moral history seems particularly compelling in the light of the fact that historians have begun to reject interpretations of Nazism as well as Fascism and Stalinism as amoral and barbaric.
In: TLS, 5. Droysen: Historik. Die Vorlesungen von In: Peter Leyh ed. Histo- risch-kritische Ausgabe. Stuttgart , pp. In Search of the German Occupation — Vichy ou les infortunes de la vertu. Expressions of German Guilt in and beyond. Nationalsozialistische Moral. Cultural Reflections on the Holocaust. London ; id. The Nazi Revolution in Hildesheim. Bloomington ; interventions by philosophers include: Rolf Zimmermann: Moral als Macht.
Eine Philosophie der historischen Erfahrung. Rein- Paul Nolte Ed. True, by , a disenchantment with the idea of liberal democracy could be found all over Western Europe as well as in the United States. Zum Zusammen- hang von Philosophie, Ideologie und Moral. Ethik und nationalsozialistische Verbrechen.
Ideology and Ethics against Human Dignity. Amsterdam ; id. Helmuth Plessner: Die Emanzipation der Macht. The essay first appeared in: Heinz Haller et al. Hannover , pp.
Recivilizing Germans through Political Education. Hartmann: Autoritarismus und Nationalismus — ein deutsches Problem? See also Thomas Ellwein: Was hat die politische Bildung erreicht? In: Theodor Pfizer ed. Politische Bildung im Wandel. Stuttgart ; id.
White Russia's New Politics. In Britain, observers used middle-class stereotypes to describe the protesters, characterizations that the protesters often used themselves to enhance their political and social reputation. First, there are general problems of interpretation. Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. Texts and films for analysis include: H. The term "" refers to a cluster of events and processes that began in the early s with roots stretching back into the s , reaching an initial highpoint in some but not all national settings around the calendar year , and then splintering off into a number of different directions over the next decades.
Both countries voluntarily dismantled representative gov- ernment, the rule of law and liberal institutions generally and opted for dictator- ship, a charismatic leader and a style of politics that was at once utopian and para- noid and which would lead to mass-murder, total war, and, in the case of Nazi Germany, genocide. In: Jean Hytier ed. Paris , pp. Maier: Italien und Deutschland nach Von der Notwendigkeit des Vergleichs. Italien und Deutschland — Berlin , pp. Individual Rights and Democratic Individuality.
Individualism and Democratic Culture.
Text und Kommentar. A Critical Guide. The Unsociable So- ciability of Human Nature. Anmerkungen zu einem Kantischen Begriff. In: Karl Dietrich Bracher et al. In reality, the many forms of sociability in a liberal democracy of- fer citizens an opportunity to assemble in public spaces that allow for a shared awareness of how different we are. Unlike other postwar Europeans, West Germans could not in- voke a rich memory of popular resistance against Nazism in order to salvage na- tional traditions.
As a result, their sense of moral catastrophe and rupture was more pressing. Bad Homburg See also Daniel Birnbaum ed. Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition. On the Genesis and Meaning of a Concept in Under- standing. In: Moshe Zimmermann ed. Essays by three Generations of Historians. Jerusalem , pp. London , pp.
Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity. Adorno: Problems of Moral Philosophy. London , p. We said that there is no crime that a man will not commit in order to save himself. And, having saved himself, he will com- mit crimes for increasingly trivial reasons; he will commit them first out of duty, then from habit, and finally — for pleasure.
We told them with much relish all about our difficult, patient, concentra- tion-camp existence which had taught us that the whole world is really like the concentration camp; the weak work for the strong, and if they have no strength or will to work — then let them steal, or let them die. The world is ruled by neither justice nor morality; crime is not punished nor virtue rewarded, one is forgotten as quickly as the other. The world is ruled by power and power is obtained with money. To work is senseless, because money cannot be obtained through work but through exploitation of others.
And if we cannot exploit as much as we wish, at least let us work as little as we can. Moral duty? We believe neither in the morality of man, nor in the morality of systems. Harmondsworth , pp. See also Tadeusz Borowski: Postal Indiscretions. Evanston In a public lecture of February , she based her reflections on moral philosophy on the insight that both Nazism and Stalinism had called into question the seemingly self-evident distinctions between right and wrong. Paris On Memory, Militancy, and Mo- rality. Princeton , p. As a point of departure I think we need to abandon these concepts.
Such teleological and normatively charged categories, alas, have a way of changing from valiant attempts at interpretation into opiates. While citizens of most countries pride themselves on being different, postwar Germans since have longed to be normal. Continental Liberalism and Its Discontents.
Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France. Cambridge, MA Harpprecht, born in , had been an American prisoner-of-war camp in , having spent the previous two years as a flak volunteer and artillery soldier. See also Reinhard Mohr: Total normal?
In: Der Spiegel, Ground- Paul Nolte Ed. Not surprisingly, the quest for normality turned out to be at once elusive and futile. Many turns in postwar German history reminded citizens of the ephemeral and unstable nature of normality and the peculiar place of their country within larger trajectories of Socialist and Western modernity.
Carter: The Heart of Whiteness. Normal Sexuality and Race in America, — Durham Madison Sprunger eds.
Studies in the medieval and early modern imaginations. Kalamazoo ; Georges Can- guilhem: Monstrosity and the Monstrous. For an attempt to make sense of the place of obsessions in politics see Michael Jeismann ed. Beherrschende Gedanken im wissenschaftlichen Zeitalter. Poetik und Politik des Staunens im The homes of the rich are decorated with bearded Chagall Rabbis, on canvas or on paper. Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik.
New Germany and the s. The impact of remigres on the foundation of political thought in post-war Germany. Studies in the political thought and culture of the Bonn Re- public. Geschichte der Remigration nach The New Germany. On how Elon came to write the book see: id. Berichte aus beiden Deutschland. In: Die Zeit, What clinks inside?
The same decorations sat on the chests of men who stood guard in Auschwitz awards that were won there because their recipients were good at throwing cyanide gas into sealed chambers packed with screaming naked human beings. The twelve years of Nazi rule had tainted every aspect of German life and culture. Inde- pendent of other differences, many intellectuals noted the extent to which the shadow of total war, genocide, and moral catastrophe lay over the fledgling de- mocracy.
He will remain, regardless of how hard he may and should try, sad to the depths of his soul until he dies. As might be expected such anxieties had not disappeared by What such a list of luminaries obscures, moreover, is how thousands of movers and shakers in countless family and educational associations contributed to such debates. In: Alfred Neven Dumont ed. In: Deutsche und Juden. Moeller eds. Sonja Levsen, Freiburg, was kind enough to share this quotation with me.
Paderborn ; Dirk Schumann: Legislation and Liberalization. Eine Geschichte der Erziehung im In: Dirk Schumann ed. Reden auf der Akademischen Trauerfeier am Berlin ; id. Geburtstag von Wolfgang Edelstein. Bremen ; Reinhild Kreis ed. Reisediplomatie und die deutsch- israelischen Beziehungen in den Jahren bis Ein wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Ansatz.
Bonn ; Franz Broicher: Wandel durch Aus- tausch. Der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst — Eine Chronik. Bevan now supported multilateral disarmament through the United Nations framework, which ultimately depended on Soviet consent at international conferences. After the Labour Left had lost its strongest champion, the chances that the Party—and indeed any party in Britain—would represent unilateral disarmament as its official defence policy at a general election had, therefore, become rather slim.
The second factor that prompted the meeting was that the American foreign-policy expert and former ambassador to Moscow George F. Kennan had advocated nuclear disarmament in Europe in his BBC Reith lectures: this had given the topic further resonance. There now existed a campaign that expressed the manifold fears of the British population about nuclear war. The DAC had never been able to gain much support within the British population, as its spectacular forms of attracting attention were not to most people's liking.
By contrast, the response to CND was staggering. When the Campaign went public on 17 February with a meeting in Methodist Central Hall, Westminster, the room could not hold everyone who had gathered, and overflow facilities had to be organized. The idea for such a march had come from the DAC, and there had been considerable debate among CND's organizers whether the Campaign should participate in such a march. Ever since, however, the marches have become fixed dates in the annual calendar of political events in Britain, although they were suspended for some time from the mids into the s.
While differing in nuances, all these supporters fundamentally agreed that the security of the British people could be guaranteed only if their government unilaterally renounced its nuclear weapons. Its focus was no longer on the Labour Party and pressure-group politics. Instead, the activists propagated the use of mass non-violent disobedience and direct action in order to communicate security issues. Across the Channel, in the Federal Republic, experiences of the nuclear age and the desires for security also found their expression in a new political movement. A smaller-scale movement emerged in the mids, but never had any major prominence.
Unlike in Britain, the first extra-parliamentary protests in West Germany depended on the organizational capacities and legitimacy of a political party. While the movement issued its first public announcements in late February and early March , the first public meeting took place in Frankfurt deliberately on 23 March , the anniversary of Hitler's Enabling Act and the date for another parliamentary debate on nuclear weapons. After this event, the local party organizations founded branches across the Federal Republic as regional and local committees were set up, by and large under the auspices of the SPD and the Federation of German p.
There were no central protest events as in Britain, but the many local and regional committees organized their own protests in close coordination with the KdA 's Bonn headquarters. In May, the SPD launched a campaign for state-level plebiscites against the purchase of nuclear-capable equipment for the German army.
Yet the SPD soon abandoned the campaign, after the Federal Constitutional Court had ruled its plans for plebiscites incompatible with the Basic Law and after its hopes for electoral gains in the state elections of North Rhine Westphalia in July had not paid off. A small group of pacifists from the Hamburg area who had attended the Aldermaston March decided to look for a German Aldermaston.
On Easter Friday , some hundred people marched from different locations in northern Germany to the British weapons base Bergen Hohne, close to the site of the Bergen Belsen concentration camp. Throughout, the British and West German movements maintained their momentum by adapting to developments in foreign policy and p.
With the announcement by the United States and by the Soviet Union to stop atmospheric nuclear tests in , this issue fell out of view. Both movements staged protests when France began atmospheric testing in the Sahara in , when the USSR resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in , and when the USA followed with a resumption of its nuclear weapons tests in The Cuba crisis in autumn was a particular turning point for CND. On the one hand, the new programme was presented as a move away from more radical proposals towards disarmament and towards programmes of controlling the arms race.
The historian who approaches the movements will find that diversity was their main feature. And there were almost as many different reasons for people joining as there were activists. In fact, it was only when confronted with the question of nuclear weapons that the activists came to assert their experiences explicitly with reference to what they regarded as their main social reference points.
At the same time, this emergence of experiences allowed them to identify common concerns. The experiences themselves thus simultaneously shaped and were moulded by the politics of security. Probing the actual support base of both movements is, therefore, extremely difficult. First, there are general problems of interpretation. Sociological studies are usually embedded in specific methodological assumptions that significantly influence the selection and representation of data. Moreover, the existing evidence is rather sketchy. Neither movement initially had an official membership.
In Britain, it was not introduced until the mids to inject money into an impoverished campaign, and in West Germany it was never introduced, for fear of organizational sclerosis. Bearing these restrictions in mind, it is nevertheless possible to come to some general conclusions about movement support in both countries. The supporters in both countries and the members of the movements were mostly middle class, better educated and younger than the average population, with the average age of supporters falling over time.
Young CND activists in particular tended to be better educated than the national average and came from wealthier families, with 55 per cent receiving full-time education and 48 per cent with a grammar-school background. Similarly, a contemporary British opinion poll showed that unilateral disarmament came to the bottom of the list of problems felt by British youth. In Britain, young people up to 30 and activists over 60 were over-represented in comparison to those aged between 30 and Duff recalls in her memoirs that she was exposed to frequent ridicule about her brash behaviour from her male colleagues.
While women did participate in the movements, they only rarely voiced their concerns as women. Specifically female experiences thus remained p. Most activists had what one could describe as a broadly left-wing and progressive outlook: according to one survey, 78 per cent of the British marchers read the Manchester Guardian , 80 per cent the Observer , and 53 per cent the New Statesman. West German activists also tended to come from families with, politically speaking, liberal views who had been previously involved in politics. Both the West German and British movements attracted a significant number of Christians.
The Welsh CND in particular drew on many clergymen when advertising its activities. Kingsley Martin, Edward P. Thompson, and others came from nonconformist backgrounds, although they had secularized their inherited nonconformity. Ministers frequently served as chairmen or secretaries of local CND branches. Frank Parkin's sociological research suggests that 40 per cent of former CND supporters were practising Christians, which exceeded the number of regular churchgoers.
The peculiarity of CND was the strong representation p. Nonconformists among British protesters outweighed Anglicans significantly: 52 per cent were Free Church members Quakers, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Baptists , 34 per cent Anglicans, and 4 per cent Roman Catholics. On the other hand, resistance towards the Campaign was also particularly pronounced amongst nonconformists. Similar information is not available for West Germany. There, the relatively small number of Catholics among the activists was particularly remarkable, although Catholics made up more than half of the West German population and although they were as concerned about nuclear weapons as West German Protestants.
The real fault line in opinions had, therefore, less to do with confessional allegiances than with attachment to the institutional Church. Rather, the archives of the West German campaign contain fascinating letters by grass-roots supporters that show how they came to identify with the campaign by trying to p.
Politics was not, as some people argued, the problem—it did not spoil people's characters. Rather, Haller regarded politics as the solution, as a good character could influence politics in good and moral ways. The fact that we do not have similar sources for the British campaign might well be the result of different archival cultures. But these archival cultures reflect, at least partly, the differences in the politicization of security in the two post-war societies.
British protesters could draw on a number of already existing outlets for the protests and, importantly, had an awareness of the continuities of history and campaigns that they constantly renegotiated, but that they took for granted. In West Germany, however, supporters of the campaigns and activists had a more acute awareness for the work that was required to create social bonds, as they sought, perhaps more forcefully than their British counterparts, to write themselves into the continuity of national history, a process that was complicated further by the division of Germany.
For West German activists, therefore, joining the campaign was very often also an exercise in actively expressing their democratic credentials and civility by actively producing structures of a self-consciously civilian society. Majority voting, by contrast, could not yet work in the Federal Republic, because, p. Research on protest movements in other countries has highlighted that figures based on national reference points should be treated with care. The composition of local chapters, branches, and associations often differed markedly from the national averages. For Britain, this is particularly true for the Scottish CND, in which workers were much more strongly represented than in Britain as a whole.
In particular, this was the case for the Glasgow and Clydeside areas, which had very strong working-class strongholds. It is also likely that, because of the strong nonconformist traditions in Wales, religious affiliation was higher there than the national average suggests. A private and unpublished survey, carried out by Hans-Karl Rupp in , suggests, however, that, on average, young people were not as well represented on the regional and local levels as national surveys suggest. Although these figures suggest general similarities, the movements differed significantly in how they represented public opinion.
While British opinion polls never registered more than 35 per cent popular support among the population for unilateral nuclear disarmament throughout p. CND's demand for unilateral nuclear disarmament was in content much more radical than the demands of the West German movements, as Britain already possessed nuclear weapons at the time.
By contrast, the West German protesters sought to forgo nuclear-capable equipment and to strive for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in central Europe. Differences in the ways in which different sections of society were represented highlight the complexities and ambiguities in the resonances of both campaigns. The sociological structure of the British movement reflected trends in British opinion polls much more directly than the sociological structure of the West German movement did West German ones. Polls compiled by different institutions show that Adenauer's policy of atomic armament was least rejected among those groups in the West German population as a whole most active in the movement: the younger and more educated sections of society some 60 per cent opposed.
Opposition to nuclear armaments was particularly pronounced among those who were under-represented in the movement: workers between 80 and 90 per cent.
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These different figures reflect a fundamental difference between processes of identification of the British and West German campaigns. It mattered greatly that the West German discussion was not about the stationing of Germany's own weapons and that it revolved instead around purchasing nuclear-capable equipment for the West German army that would allow it to deploy NATO weapons in collaboration with British and US p.
The feeling of helplessness in West Germany towards foreign policy was, therefore, even more pronounced than in Britain. For example, an activist called Arne H.